Civil contingencies

Contingency planning includes monitoring and assessing threats/hazards (e.g. terrorism, pandemic disease), planning to mitigate the risk, carrying out research and evaluation to ensure that the plans are suitably robust, and exercising and training to ensure implementation of the plans.

The work of the GCSA and GO-Science is to ensure that all these stages are underpinned across Government by strong science - whether research or advice.

GO-Science is currently working with other Government departments on a number of disaster planning issues.  GO-Science provided the secretariat for the Scientific Advisory Group in Emergencies (SAGE) for the Volcanic Ash emergency in 2010, and the Fukushima Nuclear incident in 2011. SAGE minutes from both those emergencies are available. Another area of work is the threat posed by avian flu and human pandemic flu - for more information please see the links in the right hand column of this page.

On counter terrorism, GO-Science is working with departments to ensure Government has the science & technology to assist in these activities.

Volcanic Ash emergency, April 2010

GO-Science played a key role in the Government response to the disruption caused by the eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland. This involved activating and supporting the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE), chaired by Sir John Beddington. The membership consisted of leading geologists, meteorologists, atmospheric scientists, and statisticians from the UK and Iceland, as well as key officials from across Government. SAGE met four times during this time (the minutes are available via the links on this web page). We have also been working closely with science providers (such as the Met Office and the British Geological Survey), the airline industries and regulators to understand and mitigate the impact of future eruptions.

The threat to the UK from Icelandic and other volcanoes remains and we continue to work with partners, nationally and internationally, to develop ways to better understand and respond to these types of events in the future.

Japan nuclear incident

On Friday 11 March 2011 a magnitude 9 earthquake hit the east coast of central Japan (Honshu island). It was the fifth largest earthquake in the last 100 years and the largest that has ever hit Japan since records began. That earthquake and associated tsunami led to a power failure at the Fukushima nuclear plant. That power failure led to a loss of cooling on the plant and that in turn led to a number of hydrogen explosions. Concerns regarding the release of radioactive material and the safety of British Nationals led to the Prime Minister seeking advice from Sir John Beddington.

Sir John convened the Scientific Advice Group in Emergencies (SAGE) to advise on the nuclear incident in Japan. This SAGE group was made up of experts from within Government and external experts from the National Nuclear Laboratory, Industry and Academia.

SAGE came to a unanimous view, in mid March that given the fuel held at Fukushima there was no need for UK nationals to evacuate areas outside the exclusion zone recommended by the Japanese Government. This advice was felt to be appropriate even in a reasonable worst case scenario. Modeling results indicated that outside the exclusion zone, even in this worst case, the risk to human health could be managed by precautionary measures, such as staying indoors to avoid exposure, iodine tablets would also be helpful, notably for infants and pregnant women. The Government put in place precautionary advice to leave an area within 80 km of the plant on 17 March and SAGE were content at this additional level of precaution.

SAGE continued to meet to review the situation at the plant and to provide information on food and water contamination as well as that of freight. Full details can be found in the SAGE minutes (available from the link on this page).
The situation at the plant is now more stable, but we continue to monitor the situation regularly. It should be recognised that it may be many years before the plant can be safely decommissioned.

Teleconferences by Sir John Beddington

Early on in the emergency it was clear that many UK nationals in Japan were understandably very worried about the situation – particularly as it was difficult to get clear information in Japan on what was happening. Consequently, Sir John Beddington held several teleconferences with UK nationals in Japan (the teleconferences were hosted by the UK embassy in Tokyo). Sir John was supported by officials from the Office for Nuclear Regulation, the Health Protection Agency and the Department for Health.

During the teleconferences, Sir John was able to outline SAGE’s overall assessment in terms of the reasonable worst case, and their view on the actual situation at the plant. UK nationals were able to ask Sir John, or the other experts, questions on specific areas that were of concern to them. The transcript of this telecon was placed on the embassy web site.

Blackett review of high impact low probability risks

The Government Chief Scientific Advisor (GCSA), Sir John Beddington, has established a process for government to engage with academia and industry to answer specific scientific and/or technical questions primarily in the security domain. These Blackett Reviews provide fresh, multi-disciplinary thinking in a specific area. In each review, a small panel of 10-12 experts are tasked with answering a well defined question or set of questions of relevance to a challenging technical problem.

The GCSA convened a Blackett review group to address the question “How can we ensure that we minimise strategic surprises from high impact low probability risks”. The panel considered how Government could best identify, assess, communicate and quantify the inherent uncertainty in these types of risk. The Review has approached the issue with fresh thinking, considering the latest approaches to the risk management cycle. The recommendations build on existing practice, with an emphasis on refreshed thinking in a number of areas. The most notable over-arching factor in these recommendations is the repeated need for the inclusion of external experts and readiness to consider unlikely risks. Additionally, the report makes clear that behavioural matters and the role of social science in risk management needs to be enhanced.

A copy of the report can be found opposite under related links.

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